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A b s t r a c t . The paper takes as a point of departure the notion of 
consensual democracy as a characteristic element of the so called 
Scandinavian Model. Both terms, i.e. the consensual democracy 
and the Scandinavian Model got really famous only after World 
War Two as potential Scandinavian ‘export goods’. The author 
argues that singularity of Scandinavian solutions within the 
labour market and politics started already before World War 
Two. The key to understanding the origin of the Scandinavian 
Model lies in understanding of the nature of collective bargaining 
in the Nordic countries. The September Agreement of 1899 in 
Denmark and the Saltsjobaden Agreement of 1938 in Sweden are 
examples of institutionalisation of labour relations, while the 
Danish Kanslergade Agreement and the Swedish Kohandel of 
1933 are instances taken from parliamentary politics. These ex­
amples show how the pattern for conflict resolution in the 
Scandinavian countries was institutionalised.
Undoubtedly, consensual democracy and consensus- 
based decision making are the two cornerstones of the so-called Scandi­
navian Model. Consensual democracy is not a specific Scandinavian in­
vention but it is in Scandinavia that the institutions which help arriving 
at political consensus lie at the very foundation of the democratic 
process. Through this process of democratic decision making a number of 
societal goals could be defined with participation of a maximum possible 
number of political bodies representing different ideas. These bodies, 
however, do not represent any random collection of politically incoherent 
views, but are organised orderly as parties, unions, associations, etc. 
They attempt to provide a number of solutions for the society in which 
they function. More often than not the solutions offered by different par­
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ties and associations are not compatible with one another and there is a 
need to seek consensus in order to work out an efficient policy. Reaching 
consensus, especially as far as different societal goals are concerned, is a 
characteristic feature of modern democracies. When studying the nature 
of consensus in democratic systems, Scandinavian countries included, 
the basic question which has to be asked is under which conditions the 
different types of societal goals can be institutionalised.
At the crux of this problem lie the conditions under which various social groups are 
willing to accept certain conceptions of social order and societal goals as binding and 
the conditions under which they, together with entrepreneurial groups that formulate 
and present such goals, are capable of developing the requisite organisational mechan­
isms that can assure meeting needs generated by such goals.1
In Scandinavian circumstances one of the most significant organi­
sational mechanisms which helped to institutionalise societal goals was a 
net of collective agreements based on the system of collective bargaining.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING THE SCANDINAVIAN WAY
As a general rule, the Scandinavian countries are often referred to as 
consensual democracies. However, the process of constructing institu­
tions which guarantee consensual policy making has been long and diffi­
cult. Even in such peace-loving countries as those of Scandinavia con­
flicts do occur. Effective conflict resolution has become one of the most 
positive features of Scandinavian labour relations after World War Two. 
Moreover, the ability to resolve conflicts in a cultivated way, thereby 
doing the conflicting parties the least harm, has become one of the char­
acteristics of the Scandinavian Model. In this respect, however, develop­
ments before World War Two contributed substantially to institutional­
isation of this particular characteristic feature. It is in the solutions 
implemented before World War Two that we first find application of the 
consensus seeking procedures so typical of the po?t-war arrangements 
within the labour market and in politics in the Scandinavian countries.
In order to analyse the phenomenon of collective bargaining effec­
tively it is necessary to make a few preliminary remarks on terminology. 
According to one definition, bargaining or negotiation is a process in 
which two or more parties exchange goods or services and attempt to 
agree on the exchange rate for them. There are two general approaches
1 Eisenstadt, S.N.: Power, Trust and Meaning. Essays in Sociological Theory and 
Analysis. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London 1995, 136.
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to negotiations — distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining.2 
Distributive bargaining, which is most common in negotiations over 
wages, operates under so called zero-sum conditions. This means, that 
any gain obtained by one party in the process of negotiations is made at 
the other party’s expense, and vice versa. The essence of distributive bar­
gaining boils down to who gets what share of a fixed pie. Typically, in 
labour-employers negotiations over wages the representatives of the un­
ions come to the bargaining table determined to get as much money as 
possible out of the employers. Since every pay increase that the unions 
negotiate increases employers’ costs, each party bargains aggressively 
and treats the other as an opponent who must be defeated.
In contrast to distributive bargaining, integrative problem solving 
procedure operates under the assumption that one or more settlements 
exist which can create a win-win solution. To illustrate this with the 
above mentioned example of wage bargaining, employers may agree to 
increase the pay only if the unions commit themselves to increasing effi­
ciency. In this situation the focus is on what both parties gain as a result 
of the agreement, and not so much on what they have to renounce. 
Moreover, integrative bargaining is better than the distributive one be­
cause it builds long-term relationships and facilitates working together 
in the future. It bonds negotiators and allows each of them to leave the 
bargaining table having the feeling that he or she has achieved a victory. 
Distributive bargaining, on the contrary, leaves one party a loser. It 
tends to build animosities and deepen divisions.
Despite the obvious advantages of integrative bargaining, it is not the 
dominant problem solving procedure. The reason is that there is a num­
ber of conditions necessary for this type of negotiation to succeed. These 
include parties which are open with information and candid about their 
concerns; a sensitivity of both parties to the other’s needs; the ability to 
trust one another; and a willingness by both parties to maintain flexi­
bility.3 As it will be shown below, in the case of early Scandinavian nego­
tiations on the labour market there was one more precondition which 
favoured the application of integrative bargaining rather than the dis­
tributive one, namely the balance of power. In other words, the party 
which took part in the negotiations had to feel that its ability to exert 
pressure on the other party involved in the bargaining process was 
limited or balanced by the relative strength of the other party. As a re­
sult, no sooner had an agreement been struck, than the bargaining par­
ties felt insecure in their position to dictate the solutions.
2 Robbins, Stephen P.: Essentials of Organizational Behavior, Prentice Hall, New Jer­
sey 1994, 177-181.
3 Ibid., 179.
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The rationale of integrative bargaining may be paraphrased as a 
battle between two enemies in which it is uncertain which party is going 
to win since neither of them knows exactly the enemy’s power or poten­
tial. The possible outcomes of the battle are that either one party wins 
and destroys the other, or nobody wins but the fight brings about signifi­
cant losses on both sides. In this way the absolute fighting potential of 
both sides after the battle is severely diminished as the number of 
weapons has been destroyed. Now, what the integrative bargaining is 
about, is that the two seemingly equally strong enemies instead of fight­
ing with each other would rather choose to negotiate a peace treaty and 
together agree to attack a mutual enemy. Their overall fighting potential 
and security grows considerably since now they not only are not in war 
with each other but can join forces to realise a mutual goal. The target of 
the bargaining procedures and especially the bargaining practice in Den­
mark and Sweden before World War Two bear great resemblance to the 
above presented pattern of increasing the fighting potential.
It is my understanding that the success of collective bargaining and 
collective agreements in Scandinavia seems to be determined by the fact 
that at a very early date integrative bargaining has been preferred to 
distributive bargaining. In order to support this thesis I would like to 
discuss here some institutional solutions in Denmark and Sweden as ex­
amples of integrative bargaining. Even though the analysed processes of 
institutionalisation concern solutions of a different nature, in my opin­
ion, they apply the same administrative pattern of negotiations. The ex­
amples presented below, i.e. the September Agreement, the Saltsjôbaden 
Agreement, the Kanslergade Agreement and eventually the so called Ko- 
handel, exemplify the solutions from the domains of both economics and 
politics. The September Agreement of 1899 in Denmark and the Saltsjô­
baden Agreement of 1938 in Sweden are examples of institutionalisation 
of labour relations, while the Danish Kanslergade Agreement and the 
Swedish Kohandel are instances of how parliamentary politics were in­
stitutionalised. They are, in my opinion, an excellent case in point as far 
as the innovatory Nordic approach to bargaining is concerned.
In both Denmark and Sweden the economic situation in the inter-war 
years brought about numerous political and industrial conflicts of vary­
ing intensity. The situation required unconventional economic solutions 
and innovative approaches to politics and conflict resolution. Institution­
alisation of the new solutions took place in different years in both coun­
tries but by the end of the 1930s the framework for resolution of conflicts 
in the labour market was very similar. Already in the 1920s, when Social 
Democrats in both Denmark and Sweden created government, they
Institutionalisation o f Scandinavian Consensual Democracy 63
gradually gained recognition among the non-socialist parties as a re­
sponsible partner. The trade unions, which maintained a close relation to 
the Social Democrats, also got a chance to be treated as serious partners. 
The fact that labour grew stronger contributed to the successful institu­
tionalisation of the bargainingprocedures. Only under the condition that 
both parts felt that each of them was able to balance the strength of the 
other, was there a possibility of mutual recognition. As a result, thanks 
to the integrative approach, all parts had a chance to strike an agree­
ment and neither of them seemed to be a loser.
SCHOLARSHIP ADVOCATES INSTITUTIONALISATION
The 1930s were years characterised by gradual acceptance of science 
as a possible framework for societal changes. The Great Depression 
hastened the process of accepting economics as a potential source of in­
spiration for solving the oncoming problems. In Scandinavia, and espe­
cially in Sweden,4 it was natural for academics not only to engage in pub­
lic debates but also to provide solutions to contemporary economic 
problems. In Scandinavia the scientists who became politicians were not 
stigmatised. On the contrary, their competence and participation in 
government created the image of the then ruling Social Democrats as the 
only politicians able to act with energy (handlingskraftiga).5 The Stock­
holm School of Economics and the role of its leading characters in strik­
ing the historical agreements in Sweden is the best proof of the modern­
istic approach to the role of science and research in solving social and 
political conflicts. Thanks to the scholarly approach the conflicts of inter­
ests could be transformed into issues to be interpreted within a narrow 
discursive framework. Keeping the above remarks in mind, let us now 
have a look at some examples of the early practice of conflict resolutions 
in Denmark and Sweden.
4 By comparison, the influence of academics on current policy making in the 1930s 
was somewhat weaker in Denmark. However, when the political and economic situation 
required it, Bramsnæs, the Danish minister of finance, did not hesitate to make references 
to the authority of Professor Warming from the University of Copenhagen and J.M.Keynes 
as sources of inspiration for his policy. Comp.: Hansen, Svend Aage, Ingrid Henriksen: 
Dansk social historié 1914-39, Sociale brydninger. Gyldendal, Copenhagen 1984, 278.
5 “Det national0konomiske videnskab er blevet accepteret af alle parter som rammen 
omkring konflikterne; interessekonflikter er blevet transformeret til tolkningssp0rgsmâl 
inden for en snæver diskursiv ramme.” in: Guômundson, Gestur: Er der noget nordisk ved 
den nordiske model?, in: Kettunen, Pauli & Tapio Rissanen: Arbete och nordisk samhals- 
modell, Papers on Labour History IV, Tammerfors 1995, 30.
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INSTITUTIONALISING LABOUR RELATIONS -  DENMARK
The roots of institutionalised collective bargaining can be found in 
Denmark. Already in 1899 Septemberforliget (the September Agree­
ment) provided for a broad framework of peaceful conflict resolution in 
the labour market.6 It resulted in the establishment of the first collective 
bargaining platform. The centrally organised trade unions (DsF) and em­
ployers (Arbejdsgiverforening) recognised its legitimacy to represent the 
two potentially conflicting sides. The road towards the agreement was 
quite complicated. The years before 1899 were characterised by the lib­
eral approach towards work and wage agreements, i.e. it was a private 
matter between the employers and the employees. Workers organised 
trade unions which were meant to bargain with employers about work­
ing conditions and wages. When the employers did not want to negotiate 
or locked the workers out, they would use the strike as the last resort. 
In 1899 the economic prosperity and lack of work force in Denmark per­
mitted some trade unions to negotiate better pay for their members. The 
method of bargaining normally used during the conflicts then was dis­
tributive and, as a result, it was only natural that the employers who, 
this time, were losers would sooner or later strike back to make up for 
the lost income. Since other workers (initially only carpenters in seven 
towns in Jutland) also wanted to improve their work and pay conditions, 
they would strike and when the negotiations did not bring the desired re­
sult, the employers locked them out and, as a warning, applied the same 
action to different trades. Consequently, some fifty per cent of all in­
dustry workers remained unemployed.7 During the negotiations the em­
ployers initially presented eight points which were meant to regulate 
labour relations, but along with radicalisation of the conflict the 
demands were supplied with eleven more points which aimed at giving 
the employers full control over labour relations.8 According to the logic of 
distributive bargaining it was now the employers’ turn to win completely 
and leave labour as total losers. Remarkably enough, the initial eight 
points of the employers preconditions to negotiations included ideas 
which nowadays can be regarded as foundations of the integrative bar­
gaining procedures. On the one hand, most of the demands were meant
6 Ibid., 43.
7 Comp. Haue, Harry, J0rgen Olsen, J0rn Aarup-Kristensen: Det ny Danmark 1890- 
1985, Udviklingslinjer og tendens, 3rd edition, Munksgaard, [Copenhagen] 1985, 36-43. 
The exact number of the working force employed in industry can be found on page 36.
8 Mikkelsen, Flemming: Arbejdskonflikter i Skandinavien 1848-1980, Odense Univer- 
sitetsforlag, Odense 1992, 51-56.; Agerholm, S., A. Vigen: Arbejdsgiverforeningengennem 
25 ar 1896-1921, Copenhagen 1921, 82-83. '
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to centralise the system of bargaining. On the other hand, they aimed at 
regulating this system in a modernistic manner. As a point of departure, 
the initial eight points were based on full recognition of labour’s right to 
organise. In this respect the insight shown by the employers should not 
be overrated or regarded as very original from a Danish perspective. Its 
origin may have been derived from the long-lasting Danish tradition of 
guilds. Nevertheless, these eight points (without many changes) consti­
tuted the foundation of the September Agreement signed on 5 September 
1899 after four months of conflict.
Centralisation of the collective bargaining procedures resulted in 
more effective bargaining and stabilised relations within the Danish 
labour market.9 Septemberforliget initiated the integrative bargaining in 
Scandinavia. It built long-term relationships and facilitated mutual solv­
ing of problems. It bonded negotiators and allowed both DA and DsF to 
leave the bargaining table feeling they had just achieved a victory. As a 
result, the growing expertise in application of the collective bargaining 
procedure even at times of great conflicts in Denmark in the 1920s made 
it easier for the government to face the extreme conditions connected 
with the world economic crisis in the 1930s. Thanks to the notion as­
sociated with integrative bargaining the Social Democratic government 
could count on the existing institutions to alleviate the urgent need to re­
solve the growing number of conflicts. In most cases conflicts could be 
settled by arbitration without government mediation. Only in the most 
severe cases, when the economic crisis was at its peak, was it necessary 
for Thorvald Stauning to use the best of his skills (Kanslergade Agree­
ment in 1933) to convince the opposition of the necessity of governmental 
intervention in the labour market.
INSTITUTIONALISING LABOUR RELATIONS -  SWEDEN
In view of the early Danish institutionalisation of the bargaining pro­
cedures and successful application of collective bargaining it may appear 
surprising that distributive bargaining remained the main means of con­
flict resolution in Sweden until the late 1930s. Swedes, who were quite 
late in reaching an agreement regulating industrial relations in a peace­
ful manner, had to rely, to a great extent, on the unstable market de­
pendent practices. Although the first steps towards institutionalisation 
of the labour market were made in Sweden in 1896 together with the 
foundation of the Trade Union Confederation (LO) and in 1902 when, in
9 Comp, labour conflicts in other Scandinavian countries in: Mikkelsen, Flemming: Ar- 
bejdskonflikter i Skandinavien 1848-1980, Odense Universitetsforlag, Odense 1992, 370.
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response, the Employers Association (SAF) was organised, the more 
stable solution in the shape of institutionalised collective bargaining was 
worked out as late as 1938. One of the first attempts to provide for a 
comprehensive system which would resolve conflicts on the labour 
market was made in 1928 when the government of Independent Liberals 
produced a bill introducing arbitration tribunals made up of members of 
the government, employers and labour, with the power not only to recon­
cile conflicting interests, which they had had since 1909, but also to in­
terpret collective wage agreements. It is first in 1938, though, that the 
Saltsjobaden Agreement provided a solid framework for conflict resolu­
tion in line with the Danish solution from 1899.
Similar to the Danish situation prior to 1899, no serious and sincere 
collective bargaining on the Swedish labour market could take place 
before there was a balance of power between the workers and the em­
ployers. Only in the 1930s can the labour movement in Sweden be de­
scribed as transformed from a network of organisations designed to 
defend workers from capitalist exploitation to a confident alternative 
source of national leadership. The SAP signalled this by launching the 
notion of Sweden as the people’s home. The way towards this construct of 
an efficient and caring society was among others collective bargaining. 
Social Democrats gradually gained the power to put their convictions 
into practice and after 1932 they potentially had a chance to realise it. 
The world economic crisis and relative weakness of the Social Democratic 
government at that time forced them to abandon the plans for a general 
agreement. Only after the Social Democratic election victory in 1936 
were the employers incited to take a more conciliatory attitude toward 
the SAP and the LO.
Undoubtedly, the development which led both parties and especially 
the Employers’ Association to Saltsjobaden was to a great extent fostered 
by Ernst Wigforss, from 1932 to 1949 the minister of finance and one of 
the leading members in the Stockholm School. Scientific rationality 
based on economics was Wigforss’ strongest argument. He convinced the 
employers by telling them that:
the working-class movement [and] private capitalists should co-operate to achieve 
their common interest -  increased efficiency in production [through] detailed discus­
sion ... on methods for increasing capital formation, exploiting natural resources and 
new technology, promoting exports, and avoiding recessions.10
In this way Wigforss presented the raison d’etre of integrative bar­
gaining as a potential foundation of the Swedish labour market. Accord­
10 Tilton, Timothy A.: The Social Origin of Social Democracy, in American Political 
Science Review, 1974 vol. 68, 569.
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ing to his reasoning both the employers and the workers had a chance to 
become winners if only they would co-operate. Keeping this in mind, the 
representatives of both the working-class movement and private capital­
ists held a series of formal conferences at Saltsjobaden beginning in 
1936. Peace within the labour market was at stake and each of the sides 
knew its value very well. Although the LO leadership claimed it was not 
interested in the state interventionism in the labour market and, as a 
consequence, the ruling Social Democrats were excluded from the final 
negotiations between LO and SAF, unquestionably, the spirit of Social 
Democratic achievements made the employers compromise a bit more 
than before.11
The Swedish Basic Agreement concluded in Saltsjobaden in 1938 con­
tained the following stipulations, among others:
1. A bipartite, six-member Labour Market Board was established to 
deal with specified questions pertaining to the discharge of workers, 
labour disputes affecting essential public services, and restrictions upon 
the right to resort to direct action.
2. A fairly detailed procedure for negotiating agreements was pro­
vided.
3. Certain restrictions on the right of employers to discharge in­
dividual workers were adopted.
4. Certain forms of direct action were prohibited, e.g., strikes or boy­
cotts for purposes of religious, political, or personal persecution.12
The fact remains that the Saltsjobaden Agreement was not a 
completely new solution or a breakthrough as far as applying bargaining 
procedures for labour conflict resolution in Sweden is concerned. Earlier 
experiences with arbitration tribunals provided for plenty of expertise in 
institutional solutions within the labour market. The real value of the 
deal struck in Saltsjobaden lies in the qualitative change in relations be­
tween the unions and the employers. As the unions grew stronger their 
power to press for more favourable solutions was also on the rise. LO be­
came an agent capable of outweighing the employers and only in this 
position did they become equally powerful partners in the negotiations. 
What is spectacular, and what the Swedish Social Democratic govern­
ments in the 1930s should be thanked for, is that the strong position ac­
quired by the LO did not make them continue the practices of distribu­
11 Comp. Amark, Klas: Social Democracy and the Trade Union Movement, in: Misgeld, 
Klaus, Karl Molin, Klas Amark (ed.): Creating Social Democracy. A Century of the Social 
Democratic Labour Party in Sweden. The Pennsylvania University Press 1992, 75.
12 The four points based on the summary of the agreement are included in: Friis, Hen­
ning (ed.): Scandinavia Between East and West, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New 
York 1950, 131.
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tive bargaining, but rather stick to the cultivated and far-reaching 
methods of integrative negotiations. Whatever the justification, it seems 
that Ernst Wigforss’ argumentation originally meant to convince the em­
ployers was also plausible for the trade unions. It required good will on 
both sides but also the rational insight to be able to calculate the con­
sequences of the compromise.
One of the history books dealing with Sweden gives the following 
summary of the Saltsjôbaden Agreement.
Underlying the agreement itself and the human relationship growing out of it was the 
understanding on both sides of the bargaining table that labor and management had 
not only conflicting interests but common interests in the productivity and prosperity 
of the country -  a solid fact perhaps easier to recognize in a small country than in a 
large one and a fact that some foreign observers have found it difficult to appreciate. 
Obviously it was the advantage of everyone to compromise differences peaceably 
rather than engage in destructive strife.13
The above quotation conveys the essence of the Scandinavian prin­
ciple. Striking collective agreements by solving the mutual problems in 
an integrative manner is the key to understanding the singularity of the 
Scandinavian labour relations. It is this pattern of behaviour that consti­
tutes one of the main elements of the Scandinavian Model. Eventually, 
as shown above, institutionalisation of this pattern was given solid foun­
dations already before World War Two.
INSTITUTIONALISING POLITICS
The next two examples of successful application of integrative bar­
gaining can be found in the domain of Scandinavian politics. In the 1930s 
both Denmark and Sweden applied it and, but for the fact that both 
agreements were struck under the pressure of the world economic crisis, 
it is possible to claim that there was a common philosophy of compromise 
and pragmatism that lay behind these political contracts.
On 30 January 1933 the government and the Liberal Agrarians 
(Venstre) reached the so called Kanslergade Agreement (named after the 
Kanslergade street in Copenhagen where the prime minister lived) with 
the aim of counteracting the economic crisis. Unemployment was now at 
a level of forty four per cent and agriculture was no longer profitable. On 
the one hand, before the negotiations started both parties sent out sig­
nals about their willingness to reach agreement, but there were many 
preconditions which had to be cleared before this could be done. On the
13 Scott, Franklin D.: Sweden, The Nation’s History, Southern Illinois University 
Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1988, 498.
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other hand, both negotiating parties were well aware of the extremely 
difficult situation both in agriculture and the labour market. By the end 
of 1932 the prices for agricultural products continued to fall, among 
others, because of an unfavourable exchange level of the krone to pound 
sterling. The fall in prices, which so far could be helped by increasing 
production, reached the level insufficient for the farmers to maintain pro­
duction. Similarly, massive unemployment in the industry was not a 
good sign of the policies pursued by the Social Democratic cabinet.
The immediate reason for starting the negotiations in Kanslergade 
was that the employers’ demand to reduce wages by 20 per cent was re­
jected by the labour unions. This meant the lock-out for some 100,000 
workers and, as a result, an open conflict with the participation of many 
more workers. The message reached the government on 27 January 1933 
and the Social Democrats decided to propose a bill banning strikes and 
lock-outs for one year, while the wage agreements should also remain 
unchanged during this period. During the first reading of the bill in the 
Folketing the Social Democrats emphasised that such a solution was an ex­
traordinary measure which they otherwise would never support under nor­
mal circumstances. Of course, the proposal received utmost criticism on the 
part of Venstre and the Conservatives, but the representatives of Venstre 
hinted at the possibility of a broader agreement. The negotiations lasted the 
entire day on the 29th January and were continued throughout the night. 
Several times the negotiations were about to break but finally, as the Social 
Democratic party history describes it, just before the politicians were about 
to leave the prime minister’s home Stauning offered them a night-cap and 
they eventually accepted the deal.14
The most important results were that strikes and lock-outs were for­
bidden and the Danish krone was devalued by ten per cent and linked to 
sterling at the rate of £1= kr. 22,40. Under the terms of the agreement, 
the government obtained the assurance of Venstre that it would not 
vote against a social reform bill introduced by Karl Kristian Steincke. 
Despite much internal criticism received by the negotiators from other 
members of their own parties, the outcome of the negotiations put both 
the government and Venstre in the position of winners. Both parties 
achieved the solutions they regarded as satisfactory and they could also 
present themselves as pragmatic visionaries in difficult times. This is 
clearly visible in Th. Stauning’s statement in Politiken, where he claimed 
the agreement was a proof of will to life and activity among the Danish 
people. He said:
14 Bertolt, Oluf, Ernst Christiansen, Poul Hansen: En bygning vi rejser, vol. 2. For- 
laget Fremad, Copenhagen 1955, 220.
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Jeg har som de 0vrige, der deltog i forhandlingen, set bort fra en og anden priucipiel 
opfattelse; thi jeg sa tidens alvor. Jeg vidste, at folket stod foran katastrofen, og her 
gjaldt det at handle frygtl0st og sikkert. Forliget vil ikke blot befri landet for den store 
krig, men det vil ssette millioner af kroner ind pa arbejde. Det genskaber k0be- og for- 
brugsevnen i landbruget, og det vil i form af vinterhjselp og anden social hjaelp give en 
kraftig handsrsekning til alle, der lider n0d.15
Disregarding a few principal standpoints created a win-win situation 
for both parties. Integrative bargaining served its purpose.
In Sweden unemployment reached its peak in the winter of 1932-33. 
The government wanted not only to mark its Social Democratic stand­
points but, first and foremost, to introduce the promised crisis package. 
Both Gunnar Myrdal, the economist, and Ernst Wigforss, the minister of 
finance, presented a rational programme for fighting unemployment. The 
key macroeconomic decision was replacing the yearly balancing of the 
budget by the long term balancing adjusted according to the economic 
cycle. As far as application of the appropriate methods of fighting the cri­
sis was concerned, there was quite a strong division between the govern­
ing Social Democrats and the non-socialist opposition in the Riksdag. In 
the beginning of May the debate over the popularly called ’welfare bill’ 
approached a dead end as the opposition basically favoured the old 
means of handling the crisis. However, during the debate the Social 
Democrats started looking for a more pragmatically inclined politicians 
among the opposition in order to secure the majority in favour of the bill.
In the beginning of April 1933, after a short period of informal talks, 
the SAP started regular meetings with representatives of the Agrarians 
(Bondeforbundet) in order to negotiate a mutual policy against the crisis. 
During the informal talks Social Democrats were represented by its high 
ranking politicians, the minister of finance E. Wigforss and the minister 
of agriculture P.E. Skold. The Social Democrats, who in September 1932 
built its fourth minority government, proposed to the Agrarians a new 
crisis policy constructed with due attention to the interests of the 
countryside. It concentrated mainly on fighting unemployment and was 
quite an attractive policy for the Agrarians. Bondeforbundet was the only 
non-socialist party which in 1932 gained new voters. However, the party 
as such had no chance to realise its promises unless it supported the So­
cial Democratic program. After all, the Agrarians gained more seats in 
the Parliament thanks to the group of voters who, apart from the in­
dustrial workers, were the most severely hit by the Great Depression. 
Common sense and pragmatism of the Agrarians were the elements that 
let the two parties join forces and attack the mutual enemy, i.e. unprece­
dented unemployment. The result was that the Agrarians agreed to sup­
15 Ibid., 220.
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port the Social Democratic ‘welfare bill’ if appropriate help was granted 
to the farmers. The agreement was announced on 27 May 1933 and it 
provided grounds not only for a successful implementation of the crisis 
policy, but, until the election in 1936 proved to be quite a stable political 
platform for other legislation as well.16
Undoubtedly, the Danish solution in the shape of the Kanslergade 
Agreement served as an example for the Swedish Social Democrats.17 
Danes showed the way by proving that at the times of crisis it was not 
only necessary but also easier for all parties to bury the ideological 
hatchet and look for more pragmatic solutions. The Swedish Social 
Democrats, who originally looked only for a good tactical solution in 
order to introduce their own crisis package, realised that the long term 
success of their politics and ability to stay in power could only be 
guaranteed if there existed a stable majority in favour of their policy. 
This majority could only be achieved through the practice of integrative 
bargaining applied to ever more numerous spheres of economy and 
politics.
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